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Abstract
We present a number of models for the adword auctions used for pricing advertising slots
on search engines such as Google, Yahoo! etc. We begin with a general problem formulation
which allows the privately known valuation per click to be a function of both the identity of the
advertiser and the slot. We present a compact characterization of the set of all deterministic
incentive compatible direct mechanisms for this model. This new characterization allows us
to conclude that there are incentive compatible mechanisms for this auction with a multi-
dimensional type-space that are not affine maximizers. Next, we discuss two interesting special
cases: slot independent valuation and slot independent valuation up to a privately known slot
and zero thereafter. For both of these special cases, we characterize revenue maximizing and
efficiency maximizing mechanisms and show that these mechanisms can be computed with a
worst case computational complexity O(n2m2) and O(n2m3) respectively, where n is number
of bidders and m is number of slots. Next, we characterize optimal rank based allocation rules
and propose a new mechanism that we call the customized rank based allocation. We report the
results of a numerical study that compare the revenue and efficiency of the proposed mechanisms.
The numerical results suggest that customized rank-based allocation rule is significantly superior
to the rank-based allocation rules.
Keywords: Pay-per-click adword Auctions, Dominant Strategy Equilibrium, Assignment Problem.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search advertising is a major source of revenue for internet search engines. Close to 98%
of Google’s total revenue of $6 billion for the year 2005 came from sponsored search advertisements.
It is believed that more than 50% of Yahoo!’s revenue of $5.26 billion was from sponsored search
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advertisement. Sponsored search advertisements work as follows. A user queries a certain adword,
i.e. a keyword relevant for advertisement, on an online search engine. The search engine returns
the links to the most “relevant” webpages and, in addition, displays certain number of relevant
sponsored links in certain fixed “slots” on the result page. For example, when we search for
“Delhi” on Google, in addition to the most relevant webpages, eight sponsored links are also
displayed which include links to websites of the hotels in Delhi. Every time the user clicks on any
of these sponsored links, she is taken to the website of the advertiser sponsoring the link and the
search engine receives certain price per click from the advertiser. It is reasonable to expect that, all
things being equal, a user is more likely click on the link that is placed in a slot that is easily visible
on the page. In any case, the click likelihood is a function of the slot, and therefore, advertisers
have a preference over which slot carries their link and are willing to pay a higher price per click
when placed on a more desirable slot. The chance that a user clicks on a sponsored link is likely
to be an increasing function of the exogenous brand values of the advertisers; therefore, search
engines prefer allocating more desirable slots to advertisers with higher exogenous brand value. In
conclusion, the search engines need a mechanism for allocating slots to advertisers. Since auctions
are very effective mechanisms for revenue generation and efficient allocation, they have become the
mechanism of choice for assigning sponsored links to advertising slots.
Adwords auctions are dynamic in nature – the advertisers are allowed to change their bids quite
frequently. In this paper, we design and analyze static models for adword auctions. We use the dom-
inant strategy solution concept in order to ensure that the static model adequately approximates
dynamic adword auctions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
(a) We formulate a general model for “pay-per-click” adword auctions when the privately known
valuation-per-click vij of advertiser i is a function of the allocated slot j. Thus, the advertisers
have a multi-dimensional type-space. We characterize the set of all dominant strategy incentive
compatible, individually rational allocation rules. Using this characterization, we show that
there exist incentive compatible allocation rules that are not affine maximizers (see Example
1). For details see §2.
(b) When private valuation-per-click vij is not a function of the slot j, we completely solve the
mechanism design problem, i.e. we characterize of the set of all dominant strategy incentive
compatible, individually rational allocation rules, the unique prices that implements these rules,
and the revenue maximizing mechanism and a computationally tractable implementation.
For this model, we analyze rank-based allocations rules and show how to compute an optimal
rank based allocation rule. We show that even when the click-through-rate matrix is separable,
i.e. cij is of the form cij = φiµj, the efficiency maximizing rank vector and revenue maximizing
rank vector are not same, moreover, the unconstrained revenue maximizing mechanism is em
not rank based (see Example 2).
We also propose a new, easy to implement allocation rule that we call the customized rank
based allocation rule. We show that the this new rule has significantly superior performance
– both in terms of efficiency and revenue – when compared with rank based mechanisms. For
details see § 3.
(c) We analyze a model in which the valuations are privately known constant up to a privately
known slot and zero thereafter, henceforth called the slotted valuation model. We present two
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suboptimal (revenue maximizing) mechanisms for this model, which perform remarkably well
on a set of synthetic data. See § 4 for details.
(d) We implement all the proposed mechanisms and test their relative performance on a set of
synthetic data. See § 5.
Our models are still far from capturing all the important tradeoffs in the current business models
for adword pricing. In particular, we don’t model the influence of budgets, risk averseness, bidder
irrationality (or bounded rationality) and diversification across adwords. There is growing literature
which focuss on these aspects on adword auctions, some of which we discuss in our literature survey.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the relevant literature in § 1.1. In § 2 we describe the
general adword auction model. In § 3 we discuss the adword auction model with slot independent
private valuations. In § 4 we propose and analyze the slotted model. In § 5 we discuss the results
of a preliminary numerical study and § 6 contains some concluding remarks.
1.1 Previous Literature
The online adword auctions have caught the attention of the academic community only recently –
after all, sponsored search and the Internet itself is a recent phenomena when compared with the
long tradition of research in auction theory. The papers that specifically address adword auctions
from the perspective of auction theory include Aggarwal et al. (2006b), Edelman et al. (2005) and
Lahaie (2006). Edelman et al. (2005) present a comprehensive introduction and history of the
adword auctions. Edelman et al. (2005) study an adword auction model with slot independent
valuation, separable click-though-rate and generalized second price payment rule. They observe
that truth-telling is not a dominant strategy for this auction. Aggarwal et al. (2006b) also study
the same model and propose a payment rule under which any rank based allocation rule can be made
dominant strategy incentive compatible. They also show that if the click-though-rate is separable
(in which case the Vickery-Clark-Groves (VCG) allocation rule is rank based) there exists an ex-post
equilibrium which results in same pointwise revenue as the generalized second price auction. This
equilibrium is a simple adaptation of the equilibrium in Edelman et al. (2005). We demonstrate
that this revenue equivalence follows in a straightforward manner from the fact that the private
information in the uniform valuation model is single dimensional. Lahaie (2006) characterizes the
equilibrium bidding strategies in rank based mechanisms with first price and second price payment
schemes in both complete and incomplete information setting.
Varian (2006) characterizes the Nash Equilibrium in an adword auction with first price payments.
In this model, the value per click only depends on the identity of the bidder and the click through
rate only depends on the slot. Varian (2006) also reports results of comparing the prices predicted
by the Nash equilibrium to empirical prices.
Zhan et al. (2005), Feng (2006a) and Lim and Tang (2004) present a Bayesian Nash analysis of a
related adword auction model with one dimensional private information. Feng (2006b) studies bid
price cycling in online auctions. Feng et al. (2005) assume truthful bidding and study the revenue
performance of alternative rank based mechanisms using simulation. Liu and Chen (2005) propose
using historical bid as the prior for designing the auctions. Kitts et al. (2005) present a simplified
analysis of the equilibrium behavior with very few assumptions, focussing on dynamic behavior and
empirical analysis of the bid data.
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Shapley and Shubik (1972) describe an efficient assignment game in which bidders are assigned to
objects with each bidder receiving at most one object. See Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2006) for
a recent survey of mechanisms that yield efficient equilibria for the assignment game. Leonard
(1983) showed that a specific optimal dual solution of the matching linear program implements the
efficiency maximizing allocation in dominant strategy.
The characterization of the incentive compatibility constraint in the slotted model is based on
Iyengar and Kumar (2006) where the authors study one-sided incentives in a reverse auction model.
Vohra and Malakhov (2005) also consider a similar but restrictive model. We show in § 4 that
this restrictive model is not adequate in the setting considered in this paper (see Example 3).
Aggarwal et al. (2006a) propose a top-down auction for a slotted model with bidder independent
click-through-rate and show that this auction has an envy-free Nash equilibrium with the same
allocation and prices as the efficiency maximizing VCG mechanism. We show in § 3 that the
top-down allocation rule is a special case of the customized rank-based allocation rule.
Notation
We denote vectors by boldface lowercase letters, e.g. v. A vector indexed by −i, (for example
x−i) denotes the vector x with the i-th component excluded. We use the convention x = (xi,x−i).
Scalar (resp. vector) functions are denoted by lowercase letters, e.g. Xij(vi,v−i) (resp. X(vi,v−i)).
The possible misreport of the true parameters are represented with a hat over the same variable,
e.g. vˆ). We will use the terms advertiser and bidder interchangeably.
2 Adword Auction Model
There are n advertisers bidding for m(≤ n) slots on a specific adword. Let cij denote the click-
through-rate when advertiser i is assigned to slot j. For convenience, we will set ci,m+1 = 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , n.
Assumption 1. The click through rates {cij} satisfy the following conditions.
(i) For all bidders i, the rate cij strictly positive and non-increasing in j, i.e. all bidders rank
the slots in the same order.
(ii) The rates cij , for all (i, j) pairs i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, are known to the auctioneer.
(iii) Only the rates (ci1, ci2, . . . , cim) are known to bidder i, i.e. each bidder only knows her click-
through-rates.
The true expected per-click-value vij of slot j to advertiser i is private information. We assume
independent private values (IPV) setting with a commonly known prior distribution function that
is continuously differentiable with density f(v1, . . . ,vn) =
∏n
i=1 fi(vi) : R
m×n
+ 7→ R++. Note that
even through we use dominant strategy as the solution concept, we still need the prior distribution in
order to select the optimal mechanism. We restrict attention to direct mechanisms – the revelation
principle guarantees that this does not introduce any loss of generality.
Let b ∈ Rn×m+ denote the bids of the n bidders. An auction mechanism for this problem consists
of the following two components.
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1. An allocation rule X : Rn×m+ 7→ {0, 1}n×m that satisfies∑n
i=1Xij(b) = 1, j = 1, . . . ,m,∑m
j=1Xij(b) ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , n.
Thus, X(b) is a matching that matches bidders to slots as a function of the bid b. Henceforth,
we denote the set of all possible matchings of n advertisers to m slots by Mnm.
2. A payment function T : Rn×m+ 7→ Rn that specifies what each of the n bidders pay the
auctioneer.
We show below that one can set the payment of the bidder who is not allocated any slot to zero
without any loss of generality. Thus, we can define the per click payment ti of advertiser i as
ti(b) =
Ti(b)∑m
j=1 cijXij(b)
.
For v ∈ Rn×m+ and i = 1, . . . , n, let
uˆi(b,v; (X,T),v−i) =
m∑
j=1
(
cijvij − Ti(b,v−i)
)
Xij(b,v−i) (1)
denote the utility the advertiser i of type vi who bids b. When the mechanism (X,T) is clear by
context, we will write the utility as uˆi(b,v;v−i).
We restrict attention to mechanisms (X,T) that satisfy the following two properties:
1. Incentive compatibility (IC): For all v ∈ Rn×m+ and all i = 1, . . . , n,
vi ∈ argmax
b∈Rm+
{
ui(b; (X,T),v−i)
}
, (2)
i.e. truth telling is ex-post dominant.
2. Individual rationality (IR): For all v ∈ Rn×m+ and all i = 1, . . . , n,
argmax
b∈Rm+
{
ui(b; (X,T),v−i)
} ≥ 0, (3)
i.e. we implicitly assume that the outside alternative is worth zero.
Let
ui(vi; (X,T),v−i) = max
b∈Rm+
{uˆi(b,vi; (X,T),v−i)} (4)
denote the maximum attainable utility for advertiser i under the mechanism (X,T). If the mech-
anism (X,T) is IC and IR then clearly,
ui(vi; (X,T),v−i) = uˆi(vi,vi; (X,T),v−i) (5)
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Next, we develop an alternative characterization of the IC constraint. Fix v−i and consider the
optimization problem of i-th bidder,
ui(vi,v−i) = max
vˆi∈Rm+
{ m∑
j=1
(cijvij −Ti(vˆi,v−i))Xij(vˆi,v−i)
}
.
Clearly ui is convex in vi since it is a maximum of a collection of linear functions and by envelope
conditions its gradient (under truth-telling) is given by
∇viui(vi,v−i) = (ci1Xi1(vi,v−i), . . . , cimXim(vi,v−i))T a.e.
Thus, an incentive compatible allocation rule is always a sub-gradient of some convex function and
hence integrable and monotone1, as was first observed by Rochet (1987).
Several authors have characterized the set of incentive compatible allocation rule in quasi-linear
environments (see Lavi et al. (2004); Hongwei et al. (2004); Chung and Ely (2002); Saks and Yu
(2005) ) in terms of the absence of negative 2-cycles (also called weak monotonicity):
m∑
j=1
cij (vijXij(v) + v˜ijXij(v˜i,v−i)) ≥
m∑
j=1
cij (vijXij(v˜i,v−i) + v˜ijXij(v)) ∀vi, v˜i,v−i,
i.e. the sum of utility allocated to advertiser i at vi and v˜i under truthful bidding is greater
than the sum of utility allocated to advertiser i if he lies and bid v˜i at vi and vi at v˜i. For a
convex domain this condition implies that the allocation X is integrable and the transfer payments
implementing X are well defined. Chung and Ely (2002) propose a new implementability condition
called quasi-efficiency according to which an allocation rule X is IC if, and only if, for all i, θ, there
exist functions gi : Θ
n−1 ×A 7→ R such that
X(θ) = argmax
a∈A
{vi(θi, a) + gi(θ−i, a)} ,
where θ is the private information and A is the set of allocations. For efficient allocations, the
functions gi is just the sum of utilities of all bidders other than i at their respective type θ−i.
One drawback of these characterizations is that they guarantee existence of transfer payments but
do not provide any way of computing them. We give a new characterization of IC allocation rules
directly in terms of bidder dependent slot prices.
Lemma 1. An allocation rule X : Rn×m+ 7→ Mnm is incentive compatible if and only if for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n and v−i ∈ R(n−1)×m+ , there exists per-click prices pi ∈ (R ∪ {∞})m and pi0 ∈ R ∪ {∞}
such that,
Xij(v) = 1⇒ cij(vij − pij) ≥ max
{{cik(vik − pik)}mk=1,−pi0}.
Proof: Fix i, v−i and suppress the dependence on v−i. X is IC iff there exists convex functions
(i.e. the indirect utilities) ui : R
m
+ 7→ R such that
∇ui(vi) = cijej for some j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} a.e.
1The function X : Rm+ 7→ R
m is monotone if for every y, z ∈ Rm+ , (y − z)
T(X(y)−X(z)) ≥ 0
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where ej is the j-th unit vector, e0 = 0 and ci0 = 0. Since a convex function is absolutely
continuous, it follows that ui is piecewise linear. Furthermore, a piecewise linear function is convex
if, and only if, it is the pointwise maximum of each of its pieces; thus,
ui(vi) = max
0≤j≤m
{
cijej
Tvi − cijpij
} ∀vi. (6)
Define
Sj = {v ∈ Rm+ |Xij(v) = 1}, j = 1, . . . ,m, and S0 = {v ∈ Rm+ |Xij(v) = 0 ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
Recall that ui(vi) =
∑m
j=1(cijvij − Ti(vi))Xij(vi). We claim that Ti(vi) = Tij for all vi ∈ Sj , i.e.
the payment for bidder i does not change with her bid as long as she gets the same slot2. Suppose
this is not the case and there exists v1i 6= v2i ∈ Sj such that Ti(v1i ) < Ti(v2i ). Then the bidder with
valuations v2i would lie and bid v
1
i . Thus,
ui(vi) =
m∑
j=1
(cijvij − Tij)Xij(vi) (7)
Comparing (6) and (7), and noting that Xij(v) = 1 iff ∇ui = cijej , we get Tij = xijpij and
Xi(vi) ∈ argmax
0≤j≤m
{cij(vij − pij}
where we set vi0 = 0 for notational ease. This establishes the result.
Since −pi0 is the surplus of bidder i when she is not assigned any slot, IR implies that pi0 ≤ 0. For
any given IC and IR mechanism and a fixed v−i, let p = min0≤j≤m(cijpij) < 0 then p˜ij = pij−p/cij
also satisfies IC. To see that p˜ satisfies IR, let j∗ ∈ argmax0≤j≤m{cij(vij − pij)}. Then
cij∗(vij∗ − pij∗) ≥ cik(vik − pik), ∀k 6= j∗
≥ −cikpik, ∀k 6= j∗
≥ −p;
implying cij∗(vij∗−p˜ij∗) ≥ 0. Since the auctioneer would always like to minimize the bidder surplus,
in the remainder of the paper, we will assume that all the prices are restricted to be positive and
pi0 is set to 0.
The above lemma can be interpreted as follows. An allocation rule, X is IC if, and only if, there
exist bidder-dependent slot prices such that bidders self-select the slot allocated to them by X.
Thus, any deterministic incentively compatible mechanism is uniquely identified by the pricing
rules pi : R
(n−1)×m
+ 7→ (R ∪ {∞}m.
To further understand the relationship between the characterization in Lemma 1 and integrability
and monotonicity of the IC allocation rule. Fix v−i. Lemma 1 implies an allocation rule is IC if
and only if the following two conditions are satisfied.
(1) If we increase vij , keeping the rest of the component of vi constant, there exist a threshold
value pij such that for all vij ≤ pij, advertiser i is not allocated a slot j and for all vij > pij
advertiser i is allocated slot j.
2This claim has been observed in several previous works in more general settings.
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Figure 1: IC Allocation Rules
(2) The normal to the hyperplane separating the region in which advertiser i is allocated slot
j (i.e. Sj) and the region in which advertiser i allocated slot k (i.e. Sk) is parallel to
(0, . . . , cij , . . . ,−cik, . . . , 0).
Condition (1) implies monotonicity of X, i.e. the convexity of the surplus function, and condi-
tion (2) implies integrability of X. Figure 1 illustrates the above conditions when there are only
two advertising slots. For fixed v−i, there exist pi1 ≥ 0 and pi2 ≥ 0 such that
Xi =


(0, 0) vi1 ≤ pi1, vi2 ≤ pi2
(1, 0) vi1 ≥ p1, ci2(vi2 − pi2) ≤ ci1(vi1 − pi1)
(0, 1) otherwise
2.1 Social surplus maximization
It is well known that truth telling can be implemented in dominant strategies by the Vickery-Clark-
Groves (VCG) mechanism (Groves (1979)) using the allocation rule Xe that maximizes the social
surplus
Φ(v, n) = max
X∈Mnm
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
cijvijxij (8)
It is also well known that the linear programming (LP) relaxation of (8) obtained by relaxing the
constraint Xij ∈ {0, 1} to Xij ∈ [0, 1] is equivalent to a maximum weight flow problem on bipartite
graph with unit capacities. For any such network flow problem, there exists an optimal flow that
takes values in the set {0, 1}, i.e. the flow is optimal for (8), and can be computed O(nm2) time (see,
e.g. Ahuja et al. (1993)).
Let
pei (v) =
m∑
j=1
1
cij
{
vij − (Φ(v, n) −Φ(v−i, n− 1))
}
Xij(v) (9)
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denote the per-click VCG prices. For j = 1, . . . ,m, let i∗j denote the index of the bidder as-
signed to slot j, i.e. Xi∗j ,j = 1. Leonard (1983) established that the vector of slot prices ν
e
j =∑n
i=1 p
e
i (v)Xij(v), j = 1, . . . ,m, are the unique optimal solution of the LP
min
∑m
j=1 νj
s.t. ρi + νj ≥ cijvij, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m,
ρi∗j + νj = ci∗j jvi∗j j, j = 1, . . . ,m,
ρ,ν ≥ 0.
Since Xe(v) is a piecewise constant function of v and given Xe, νe(v) is a piecewise linear function
of v, it follows that the per-click VCG price pei (v) is a piecewise linear function of v.
Let
Φ˜j(v−i) = max
{ n∑
k=1,k 6=i
m∑
l=1,l 6=j
cklvklxkl : xij = 1,X ∈ Mnm
}
,
i.e. Φ˜j(v−i) denotes the maximum achievable social surplus excluding the bidder i and the slot j.
Then the bidder dependent slot prices defined in Lemma 1 are given by
pij(v−i) =
1
cij
(
Φ(v−i, n− 1)− Φ˜j(v−i)
)
. (10)
It is easy to check that if bidder i is assigned slot j in Xe, the price pij(v−i) = p
e
i (v). From (10) it
is clear that the prices pi(v−i) are piece-wise linear functions of v−i. These prices can be efficiently
computed by solving the two optimal weighted matching problems.
2.2 Revenue maximization
We first consider the case n = 1. This corresponds to monopoly pricing of stationary advertise-
ment, e.g. lease pricing of slots on the public webpages. It follows from Lemma 1 that a revenue
maximizing mechanism for a risk-neutral auctioneer is to allow the bidders to self-select slots based
on the posted slot prices
p∗ ∈ argmax
p∈Rm+
m∑
j=1
pjcjE
[
1
(
j ∈ argmax
1≤k≤m
{ck(vk − pk)}, vj ≥ pj
)]
, (11)
where E denotes the expectation with respect to the prior distribution f(v) of the valuation vector
v = (v1, . . . , vm).
For n > 1, the optimal revenue optimizing mechanism is the solution of the stochastic optimization
problem
max E
[∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 cijpij(v−i)Xij(v)
]
s.t. X(v) ∈Mnm a.s.
vij − pij(v) = maxk
{
vik − pik(v−i)
}
, ∀v, i, j s.t. xij(v) = 1.
(12)
The stochastic optimization problem (12) is likely to be computationally hard and very sensitive
to the prior distribution. See Rochet and Chone (1998) for a general treatment of the mechanism
design problem with multidimensional type.
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2.3 Affine maximizers vs general pricing rules
In this section we relate the bidder-dependent per-click slot prices to prices implied by allocation
rules that maximize an affine function of the bidder surplus.
In our setting, a mechanism (X(v),T(v)) is called an affine maximizer auction if there exists
constants {wij} and {rij} such that X(v) maximizes
Φw,r(v) = max
X∈Mnm
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
[wicijvij + rij ]Xij ,
and the payment Tw,ri (v) when bidder i is assigned to slot j is given by
T
w,r
i (v) =
1
wi
[
Φw,r(v−i, n− 1)− Φw,r(v) + (wicijvij + rij)
]
The constants {rij} can be interpreted as bidder-dependent slot reservation prices. The affine
maximizer allocation rule X(v) also corresponds to an optimal flow in an appropriately defined
network flow problem and the payments T(v) correspond to an appropriately defined minimal dual
optimal vector.
The bidder-dependent slot prices pij(v−i) that implement the affine-maximizer allocation rule are
given by
pij(v−i) =
1
wi
[
Φw,r(v−i, n− 1)− Φ˜w,rj (v)
]
,
where
Φ˜j(v−i) = max
{ n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
(wicikvik + rik)xik : xij = 1,X ∈ Mnm
}
.
Since Φw,r(v−i, n − 1) and Φ˜w,rj (v−i) are piece-wise linear, the prices pij(v−i) are piecewise linear
functions of v.
Roberts (1979) showed that in a quasi-linear preference domain for a large enough type space (in
particular, when the type space is R|A| where A is the allocation space) affine maximizers are the
only dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. Given this result, a natural question that
arises is whether there exist IC allocation rules in a quasi-linear environment with a given type
space that are not affine-maximizers. Lavi et al. (2004) raise this question for a matching problem
which does not satisfy the conflicting preferences constraint (see Open Problem 2, page 36). Since
Lemma 1 does not restrict the bidder-dependent prices pi(v−i) to be of a particular form, whereas
the bidder-dependent prices corresponding to affine-maximizers are piecewise linear function of v,
there is a possibility that affine-maximizers are a strict subset of IC allocation rules.
Example 1. Consider an adword auction with two slots and two bidders. Let X(v) denote the
allocation rule that allocates slot 1 to bidder 1 if, and only if,
v11 − v12 ≥ sign(v21 − v22) · (‖v21 − v22‖)1+γ
for some 0 < γ < 1 and to bidder 2 otherwise, and assigns slot 2 to the unassigned bidder.
It is easy to check that this allocation rule is IC with prices
p11(v2) = −p12(v2) = 12 · sign(v21 − v22) · (‖v21 − v22‖)1+γ ,
p21(v1) = −p22(v1) = 12 · sign(v11 − v12) · (‖v11 − v12‖)
1
1+γ ,
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Figure 2: Incentive Compatibility: Allocated click-though-rate as a function of valuation
where the last expression follows from the fact that slot 1 is assigned to bidder 2 whenever v21−v22 >
sign(v11 − v12) · (‖v11 − v12‖)
1
1+γ .
The prices {pij(v−i)} are strictly non-linear functions of v. Consequently, X is an IC allocation
rule that is not an affine maximizer.
We conclude this section with the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There exist individually rational and incentive compatible deterministic direct mech-
anism which are not affine maximizers.
3 Slot independent valuations
In this section, we consider the special case where the true per-click valuations of all the bidders
are slot independent, i.e. vij = vi for all i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m. Thus, the type-space of the
bidders is single-dimensional.
3.1 Incentive compatible mechanisms
Lemma 2. The following are equivalent characterizations of IC allocation rules.
(a) The click-through-rate
∑m
j=1 cijXij(vi,v−i) is non-decreasing in vi for all fixed v−i.
(b) For all i and v−i there exist thresholds 0 ≤ aim(v−i) ≤ ai,m−1(v−i) ≤ · · · ≤ ai,1(v−i) ≤ ∞ such
that bidder i is assigned slot j iff vi ∈ (aij(v−i), ai,j+1(v−i)].
(c) For all i and v−i, there exist slot prices pij(v−i) of the form
pij(v−i) =
1
cij
m∑
k=j
(
aik(v−i)− ai,k+1(v−i)
)
(cij − ci,k+1), (13)
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where 0 ≤ aim(v−i) ≤ ai,m−1(v−i) ≤ · · · ≤ ai,1(v−i) ≤ ∞ such that bidders self select the slot
assigned to them.
Proof: Part (a) follows immediately from Holmstrom’s Lemma (see, p.70 in Milgrom (2004)).
SinceXij ∈ {0, 1} and cij ≥ ci,j+1 by Assumption 1(i) the total click-through-rate
∑m
j=1 cijXij(vi,v−i)
is non-decreasing with vi if, and only if, there exist thresholds 0 ≤ aim ≤ ai,m−1 ≤ · · · ≤ ai,1 ≤ ∞
such that the allocation rule X(v) allocates slot j to advertiser i iff vi ∈ (aij , ai,j+1]. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.
It is easy to check that prices of the form (13) results in bidder i self-selecting slot j if the valuation
vi ∈ (aij(v−i), ai,j+1(v−i)]. Thus, part (b) implies that the prices result in an IC allocation rule.
To prove the converse, observe that the payment Ti(vi;v−i) under any IC allocation rule X must
be of the form
Ti(vi;v−i) =
m∑
j=1
cijviXij(vi,v−i)−
∫ vi
0
( m∑
j=1
cijXij(u,v−i)
)
du− ui(0,v−i).
It is easy to check that Ti(vi;v−i)+ui(0,v−i) is equal to the area of the shaded region in Figure 2.
Thus per-click price for slot j = 1, . . . ,m,
pij(v−i) =
Ti(vi;v−i) + ui(0;v−i)
cij
,
=
1
cij
{
(aim − 0)(cij − 0) + (ai,m−1 − aim)(cij − ci,m−1) + · · ·+ (aij − ai,j+1)(cij − ci,j+1)
}
=
1
cij
m∑
k=j
(aik − ai,k+1)(cij − ci,k+1),
where we have set ci0 = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that by interchanging the order of integration, i.e. by computing the area of “horizontal”
rectangles in Figure 2, the prices pij(v−i) can be alternatively written as
pij(v−i) =
1
cij
m∑
k=j
(cik − ci,k+1)aij . (14)
3.2 Revenue maximization
From Myerson (1981), it follows that expected revenue of the auctioneer under any dominant
strategy incentive compatible allocation rule X is given by
E

 n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
cij
(
vi − 1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)
Xij(v) +
n∑
i=1
ui(0,v−i)


where fi : R+ 7→ R++ is the prior density of vi, i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, any two mechanisms (direct
or indirect) which at a dominant strategy equilibrium agree on the point wise assignment X(v)
for every v and on the equilibrium utilities ui(0,v−i) for all i,v−i result in identical expected
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revenues. Aggarwal et al. (2006b); Edelman et al. (2005) explicitly construct one equilibrium for
the generalized second price auction which results in same pointwise revenue as the truth-telling
equilibrium in the direct mechanism.
Let
X∗(v) ∈ argmax
X∈Mnm


n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
cij
(
vi − 1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)
Xij

 .
Suppose the virtual valuations per click νi(vi) = vi− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) are non-decreasing. Then the allocation
rule X∗ results in a non-decreasing total-click-through for each of the bidders. Hence, part (a) in
Lemma 2 implies that X∗ is IC. Since the pointwise maximum is an upper bound on any expected
revenue maximizing allocation, (X∗,T∗) is expected revenue maximizing, dominant strategy IC, IR
rational allocation rule with per-click prices given by (13). When the virtual valuations ν(vi) are
non-monotonic, the revenue maximizing mechanism can be constructed by first ironing (see Myerson
(1981)) the virtual valuation to obtain a non-decreasing virtual valuations ν˜i(vi) and then using
the construction above.
In the rest of this section, we show how to efficiently compute the payments, or equivalently,
thresholds corresponding to the rule X∗. Consider the allocation rules of the form,
Xψ(v) ∈ argmax
X∈Mnm


n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
cijψi(vi)Xij


for any set of ψi : R+ 7→ R+, ψi ∈ C[R] and ψi non-decreasing. We call Xψ monotone maximizer
with respect to the set of monotone transformations ψi, i = 1, . . . , n. Given v, X
ψ(v) can computed
efficiently inO(m2n) time as a solution to optimal weighted matching problem. It is straight forward
to observe that Xψ is incentive compatible and hence has the form presented in Figure 2.
As a first step towards computing the slot prices that implement the allocation rule Xψ we solve
the parametric assignment problem
max
X∈Mnm

λ
m∑
j=1
ci0jXi0j +
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
m∑
j=1
vkckjXkj

 , (15)
where λ is the parameter. It is clear that (15) is equivalent to the parametric minimum cost network
flow problem
minimize −λ∑mj=1 ci0jXi0j −∑nk=1,k 6=i∑mj=1 vkckjXkj
subject to
∑m
j=1Xij −Xsi = 0 ∀i,∑n
i=1Xij = 1 ∀j,∑n
i=1Xsi = m
(16)
on a graph G defined as follows.
(i) G has one node for every bidder and slot, and one additional node s.
(ii) G has unit capacity directed arcs from each bidder k 6= i to each slot l with cost −vkckl and
from s to each bidder with cost zero.
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Algorithm 1 OptMatch(i0,v−i0 , c)
1: a←∞, λ = 0.
2: Solver optimal matching problem at λ = 0.
3: (T,L,U)← optimal spanning tree structure for λ = 0.
4: while λ <∞ do
5: pi1 ← optimal node potentials at tree T for λ = 1 and arc costs equal to zero for all arcs
(k, l) with k 6= i0 and pi1(s)← 0.
6: pi0 ← optimal node potentials at tree T for λ = 0 and pi0(s)← 0
7: λ← min
{
pi0j−pi
0
i0
ci0j−pi
1
j+pi
1
i0
: (i0, j) /∈ T, ci0j − pi1j + pi1i0 ≥ 0
}
8: (i0, j
∗)← the edge achieving the minimum in the previous step.
9: ai0,j∗ ← λ
10: Perform a network-simplex pivot with (i0, j
∗) as the entering arc.
11: (T,L,U)← optimal spanning tree structure for λ = λ.
12: end while
(iii) G has unit capacity directed arcs from bidder i to each slot j with cost −λcij .
(iv) Each of the slots has unit demand and the node s has a supply of m units.
Lemma 3. OptMatch correctly computes the thresholds ai0j that which bidder i0 is assigned to
slot j = 1, . . . ,m, and the worst case running time of the algorithm is O(m2n).
Proof: Given a spanning tree structure (T,L,U), the node potential piλ corresponding to the
parameter value λ is given by piλ = pi0 + λpi1 with pi0 and pi1 as computed in step 5 and 6. At
each optimal spanning tree structure, the non-negativity of reduced costs for each parametric edge
(i0, j) gives a bound on λ as follows:
−λci0,j − (pi0i0 + λpi1i0) + (pi0j + λpi1j ) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ λ(ci0,j − pi1j + pi1i0) ≤ (pi0j − pi0i0)
⇐⇒


λ ≤ (pi
0
j−pi
0
i0
)
(ci0,j−pi
1
j+pi
1
i0
)
, ci0,j − pi1j + pi1i0 ≥ 0,
λ ≥ (pi
0
j−pi
0
i0
)
(ci0,j−pi
1
j+pi
1
i0
)
, ci0,j − pi1j + pi1i0 ≤ 0.
(17)
Since pi1j ≥ pi1k for each non-parametric edge (k, j), the reduced cost of non-parametric edges,
−vkckj − pi0i + pi0j + λ(pi1j − pi1k) is positive for all values of λ greater than the current λ. Thus, the
threshold on λ up to which the current spanning tree structure remains optimal is equal to the
minimum of the upper bounds in (17).
After the initial solution, the algorithm performs at most m pivots each costing O(mn), each
returning a threshold at which advertiser i can be assigned slot j. Thus, the overall complexity of
OptMatch is O(m2n).
This proof is adapted from the solution of exercise 11.48 in Ahuja et al. (1993).
Next we use OptMatch to compute slot prices implementing the monotone maximizer alloca-
tion Xψ.
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Algorithm 2 ComputePrices
1: z← (ψ1(v1), . . . , ψn(vn)), ci,m+1 ← 0, ai,m+1 ← 0 ∀i.
2: for i=1 to n do
3: a˜← OptMatch(i, z−i, c).
4: for j = 1 to m do
5: aij ← ψ−1i (a˜ij)
6: if aij =∞ then
7: aij ← minj<k≤m aik
8: end if
9: end for
10: for j=1 to m do
11: pij ← 1cij
∑m
k=j(aik − ai,k+1)(cij − ci,k+1)
12: end for
13: end for
Lemma 4. Algorithm ComputePrices correctly computes the prices pij implementing X
ψ in
O(n2m2) time.
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider the computations for bidder 1. The call to the Opt-
Match returns the thresholds at which bidder 1 get slot j in the virtual valuation space. By the
monotonicity3 of ψ1, a1p = ψ
−1
i (a˜1p) is the corresponding threshold in v-space. Step 6-8 in the
algorithm check for the condition that a slot p is never allocated to bidder 1 but a more desirable
slot k < p is allocated at a1k < ∞ and, in that case, set a1p = a1k (This convention is implied in
(13)). Step 10-12 use (13) to compute the prices p1p given the thresholds.
The dominating computation inside the FOR loops is the call to OptMatch, thus giving a
O(n ·m2n) = O(n2m2) time complexity.
The payment corresponding to the revenue maximizing allocation rule X∗ can be computed effi-
ciently using the Lemma 4 with ψi(vi) = max(νi(vi), 0).
3.3 Rank based allocation rules
Definition 1 (Rank based allocation rule). A rank based allocation rule with rank vector w ∈ Rn+
allocates slot j to the bidder in the jth position in the decreasing order statistics of {wibi}ni=1, where
b is the vector of advertiser’s bid.
LetXw denote the rank based allocation rule with ranking vectorw ∈ Rn+. Let γ = [w1b1, . . . , wnbn].
Then under Xw, the total click-through rate for bidder i is given by
m∑
j=1
cijX
w
ij (b) =
m∑
j=1
(cij − ci,j+1)1(γi ≥ γ−i[j] ),
where γ−i[j] denotes the j-th largest term in the vector γ−i and 1(·) denotes the indicator function
that takes the value 1 when its argument is true, and zero otherwise. Since γi is increasing in bi
3If ψi(vi) is flat in some interval ψ
−1
i (.) is taken to right continuous at the point of discontinuity.
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and cij ≥ ci,j+1, it follows that the total click-through rate
∑m
j=1 cijX
w
ij (b) is non-decreasing in bi.
Thus, by Lemma 2 part(a), Xw is incentive compatible.
Lemma 5. The unique per click price pwij , implementing the rank based allocation rule, X
w are
given by,
pwij(v−i) =
m∑
k=j
(cik − ci,k+1
cij
)γ[k+1]
wi
(18)
Proof: Fix v−i. The rank based allocation rule with ranking vector w allocates slot j to advertiser
i iff γ[j] ≥ wivi > γ[j+1]. Thus, the thresholds aij , j = 1, . . . ,m (see Lemma 2, part (b)) are equal
to
γ[j+1]
wi
. Thus (18) follows from the alternative characterization of per click prices in Lemma 2,
part (c).
Aggarwal et al. (2006b) computes (18) using arguments especially tailored for rank based alloca-
tions.
The simplicity of the rank based mechanisms make them a very attractive. However, which rank
vector w to use is far from clear! In particular, if the click-though-rate is not separable, i.e.
cij 6= φiµj , then both the Google rank vector (wi = ci1) and the Yahoo! rank vector (w = 1)
neither maximize efficiency nor maximize revenue. We show that even when the click-through-rate
is separable the revenue maximizing rank vector is not the same as the efficiency maximizing rank
vector and the revenue maximizing mechanism is not rank-based!
Example 2. Consider an adword auction of two slots and two bidders with valuations, vi uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. Suppose a rank based auction mechanism awards the slot 1 to advertiser 1 if
v1 ≥ αv2 and to merchant 2 otherwise. Define A = c11 − c12 and B = c21 − c22. Then the prices in
(18) imply that the expected revenue of the auctioneer,
Π(α) = E(v1,v2)
[
Aαv21(v1 ≥ αv2) +Bv1
α
1(v2 ≥ v1
α
)
]
Simplifying, we get
Π(α) =


A 16α +B(
1
2α − 13α2 ) if α ≥ 1
A(α2 − α
2
3 ) +B
α
6 if α ≤ 1
Thus the optimum4,
α∗ =


4B
A+3B if B ≥ A
3A+B
4A if A ≥ B
Similar calculation for efficiency shows that the expected social surplus S(α) is given by,
S(α) =
{
1
3αA− 16α2B + 12(c21 + c12) if α ≥ 1
α
3B − α
2
6 A+
1
2(c22 + c11) if α < 1
and the efficiency maximizing rank vector αe = B
A
. Thus, α∗ 6= αe.
4The optimal point can be graphically verified to be unique. For α ≤ 1, Π(α) is concave and for α ≥ 1, Π(α) even
though neither convex nor concave, monotonically increases up to a constant min(1, 3A+B
4A
) and decreases thereafter.
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Figure 3: Revenue and efficiency as a function of α in Example 2
Now, assume that the click-through-rate is separable, cij = φiµj, for φ > 0 and µ1 ≥ µ2 > 0. Then
the revenue maximizing rank vector
α∗ =


4φ2
φ1+3φ2
if φ2 ≥ φ1
3φ1+φ2
4φ1
if φ1 ≥ φ2
and the efficiency maximizing rank vector αe = φ2
φ1
. Since vi are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the
virtual valuations νi(vi) = vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) = 2vi − 1, and the revenue maximizing allocation
X∗ ∈ argmax
X∈M22
m∑
j=1
µj
n∑
i=1
φi(2vi − 1)xij
Thus, X∗ assigns slot 1 to bidder 1 if v1 ≥ φ2φ1 v2 +
φ1−φ2
2φ1
and to bidder 2 otherwise. This is not a
rank based allocation even though the click-through-rate is separable! The efficiency maximizing
allocation rule is clearly rank based with αe = φ2
φ1
.
Figure 3 plots the efficiency and revenue as a function of α for c =
[
50 10
50 40
]
. For this data,
α∗ = 0.8125 and αe = 0.25. The efficiency maximizing ranking vector being more biased than the
revenue maximizing vector because even though bidder 2 generates more value in slot 2, bidder 1
determine the slot price.
We propose customized rank based allocation rule as an improvement over the rank based allocation
rule. This rule reduces to the top dowm auction proposed in Aggarwal et al. (2006a) when cij ≡ cj ,
i.e. bidder independent click-through-rates.
Definition 2 (Customized Rank Based Allocation). A customized rank based (CRB) allocation
rule allocates slot j to the bidder having highest order statistics of {cijbi}ni=1 among those who have
not been assigned a slot < j.
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Algorithm 3 ComputeCRPrices
for i = 1 to n do
S← φ, Ni ← {1, . . . , n} \ {i},j ← 1,ci,m+1 ← 0, ai,m+1 ← 0.
for j = 1 to m do
(s, I)← maxk∈Ni\S({ckjvi}).
aij ← scij , S← S
⋃
I
end for
for j = 1 to m− 1 do
if aij < ai,j+1 then
ai,j+1 ← aij
end if
end for
for j=1 to m do
pij ← 1cij
∑m
k=j(aik − ai,k−1)(cij − ci,k−1)
end for
end for
Using Lemma 2, it is straightforward to deduce that the CRB allocation is incentive compatible.
Thus, the prices implementing CRB allocation rule satisfy (13). Algorithm ComputeCRBPrices
computes the prices implementing customized rank based allocation rule in O(n2m) time. Estab-
lishing correctness of the algorithm is straightforward and is left to the reader. Also, by using the
virtual valuations,
z =
((
v1 − 1− F1(v1)
f1(v1)
)+
, . . . ,
(
vn − 1− Fn(vn)
fn(vn)
)+)
instead of the valuations v in Algorithm ComputeCRBPrices, the customized rank based allo-
cation rule can approximate revenue maximizing auction as well. In general, the CRB allocation
rule is likely to out-perform any rank based allocation in terms of both efficiency and revenue
generation.
3.4 Separable Click-though Rate
Suppose the click-through rate cij is separable, i.e. cij = φiµj with µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ . . . µm > 0 and
φ > 0. In this setting, the following results immediately follow from our results in the previous
section.
1. The solution to the social (virtual) surplus maximization problem is rank based, i.e. the slot
j is awarded to the jth order statistics of {φivi}ni=1 (respectively {φiνi(vi)}ni=1).
2. The price-per-click given by (9) implementing the efficiency maximizing allocation are given
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by
pe[i](v) =
1
µi
(µi − µi+1)
φ[i+1]
φ[i]
v[j+1] + p
e
[i+1]
=
1
µi
m∑
j=i
(µj − µj+1)
φ[j+1]
φ[j]
v[j+1] (19)
3. The price-per-click implementing revenue maximizing allocation rule is given by,
p∗[i](v) =
1
µi
m∑
j=i
(µj − µj+1)ν−1[i]
(
φ[j+1]
φ[j]
v[j+1]
)
(20)
where φ[k] and v[k] represent the φ and bid of advertiser ranked k.
When the click-through-rate is separable, CRB allocation rule is the same as the Google allocation
rule with rank vector wi = ci1 and is optimal for efficiency maximization.
4 Slotted Mechanism
In this section, we consider the per click valuations of the following form
vij =
{
vi, j ≤ ki
0, otherwise,
where the tuple (vi, ki) is the private information (i.e. type) of the bidder i.
The efficiency maximization problem is given by
maxX∈Mnm
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 vicijXij
subject to Xij = 0, ki < j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (21)
Since the a bid kˆi > ki is ex-post observable, the bidders are restricted to bid kˆi ≤ ki. Since
advertisers have one-sided incentives about ki, this is not a standard mechanism design problem.
However, the specific structure of the problem, namely that for all i, v ∈ Rn+ and k−i, the total
surplus is non-decreasing in ki, ensures incentive compatibility with respect to ki at the V CG
payments. When ki are common knowledge, the solution presented in § 3 can be directly applied
by pointwise maximizing the virtual surplus.
The following Lemma characterizes the set of all incentive compatible allocation rules in the slotted
valuation model. The proof is a simple adaptation of the proof of Lemma 1 in Iyengar and Kumar
(2006).
Lemma 6. The following are equivalent characterizations of IC allocation rules.
(a) The total click-through rate
ki∑
j=1
cijXij
(
(b,ki), (v−i,k−i)
)
for each bidder i is a non-decreasing function of b for all (v−i,k).
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(b) For all i,v−i and k, there exists thresholds 0 ≤ ai,m ≤ ai,m−1 ≤ · · · ≤ ai,ki ≤ ∞ such that
bidder i is allocated slot j iff vi ∈ (aij , ai,j−1].
(c) The utility of each bidder i under allocation rule X is of the form
ui(vi, ki;v−i,k−i) = ui(ki, (v−i,k−i)) +
∫ vi
0
( m∑
j=1
cijXij((u, ki), (v−i,k−i))
)
du.
where ui(ki, (v−i,k−i)) are non-negative and nondecreasing functions of ki appropriately chosen
to ensure that ui(vi, ki;v−i,k−i) is non-decreasing in ki for all (v,k−i).
Lemma 6 part (a) and (c) implies that any feasible mechanism that is IC with respect to the
valuation bid can be made IC with respect to the slot bid using independent side payments
ui(ki, (v−i,k−i)) so that the total surplus of each bidder is increasing with ki. In the rest of
this section, the term nomimal surplus will denote the term
∫ vi
0
( m∑
j=1
cijXij((u, ki), (v−i,k−i))
)
du.
Lemma 6, together a change in the order of integration (see Iyengar and Kumar (2006), Theorem
1), implies that the revenue maximization problem is equivalent to choosing a feasible allocation
rule X with Xij(v) = 0 for all ki < j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and a set of side payments ui that maximize
max
X,u
E(v,k)
n∑
i=1

 m∑
j=1
cij
(
vi − 1− Fi(vi|ki)
fi(vi|ki)
)
Xij(v)− ui(ki,v−i)


subject to the constraint that
∑m
j=1 cijXij(vi,v−i) is non-decreasing in vi for all i,v−i,k, and
ui(ki,v−i) +
∫ vi
0
(∑m
j=1 cijXij((u, ki), (v−i,k−i))
)
du is non-decreasing with ki for all i,v,k−i.
Since the social surplus depends on ki, there exist bid profiles at which the total click through rate
assigned to some bidder i is not monotone in ki. Hence, the nominal surplus,
u0i (v,k) ,
∫ vi
0
( m∑
j=1
cijXij((u, ki), (v−i,k−i))
)
du (22)
is not monotone in ki. Consequently, there does not exist any regularity conditions on the prior
distribution fi(vi, ki) that guarantees that the side payments ui can be set equal to zero without
loss of generality. Example 3 presents a concrete example to demonstrate this.
Example 3. Let c =
[
3 0
3 1
]
, and the realized k1 = k2 = 2. Suppose vi and ki are independent.
The nominal surplus, given by (22), of bidder 2
u2 =
{
1(v2 − 0) if kˆ2 = 2 and v2 < a21 = ν−12 (32ν1(v1))
3(v2 − aˆ21) if kˆ2 = 1 and v2 > aˆ21 = ν−12 (ν1(v1))
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Thus, if (v1, v2) are such that a21 > v2 >
3
2 aˆ21, bidder 2 prefers to bids kˆ2 = 1. Suppose the realized
ν1(v1) =
4
17 , then bidder 2 strictly prefers to bid kˆ2 = 1 if
3
2ν
−1
2
(
4
17
)
< v2 < ν
−1
2
(
6
17
)
.
Suppose the CDF of v2 is given by
F2(x) = 3x1{(0, 1
4
)}(x) +
[
3
4
+
1
4
(
1− e− 112 (x− 14 )
)]
1{[ 1
4
,∞)}(x)
i.e. a
(
3
4 ,
1
4
)
mixture of a uniform distribution on
(
0, 14
)
and an exponential distribution with rate
1
12 on [
1
4 ,∞) respectively. Then the corresponding virtual valuation function is
ν2(x) =
(
2x− 1
3
)
1{0, 1
4
}(x) +
(
x− 1
12
)
1{ 1
4
,∞}(x)
so that ν−12 (
4
17 ) =
29
102 and ν
−1
2 (
6
17 ) =
89
204 . Thus for all v2 ∈
(
29
68 ,
89
204
)
bidder 2 strictly prefers to
bid kˆ2 = 1.
Consequently pointwise optimal solution with side payments u set to zero does not induce truth-
telling and, hence, is sub-optimal in this example.
Vohra and Malakhov (2005) only considers the IC mechanisms with u = 0. The above example
shows that this constraint might eliminate a number of reasonable allocation rules.
Lemma 6 part(b) and a simple adaptation of Lemma 4 gives the following result.
Lemma 7. Given any set of ψi : R+ 7→ R+, ψi ∈ C[R] and ψi non-decreasing, the nominal surplus,
∫ vi
0
( m∑
j=1
cijX
ψ
ij((u, ki), (v−i,k−i))
)
du =
m∑
j=1

cijvi − m∑
k=j
(aik − ai,k+1)(ci,j − ci,k+1)

Xψij(v,k)
can be computed in O(m2n2) for any solution to (21) with vi replaced by ψi(vi).
The proof of this lemma is left to the reader.
Next, we discuss two heuristic mechanisms for maximizing revenue. The first heuristic mechanism is
defined as follows. If there exists intervals over which the virtual valuations νi(vi, ki) = vi−1−Fi(vi|ki)fi(vi|ki)
is increasing in vi, use the ironing procedure detailed in (section 3.2) Iyengar and Kumar (2006) to
compute ironed out virtual valuation νˆi(vi, ki) that is non-decreasing in vi. Set the allocation rule
X(v,k) ∈ argmax
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
cij νˆi(vi, ki)Xij(v). (23)
Since νˆi is non-decreasing in vi, X(v,k) is IC. Set the transfer payment
Ti(v,k) =
ki∑
j=1
cijviXij(v,k) − u0i (v,k) − ui(v, ki) (24)
where
ui(v,k) = max
kˆi≤ki
[
u0i ((vi, kˆi), t−i)− u0i ((vi, ki), t−i)
]
(25)
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This payment ensures that the total surplus of each bidder i is non-decreasing in ki. Since side
payments are identically zero in the V CG mechanism, it follows that the side payment above would
be identically zero if the virtual valuation are replaced by valuation. Lemma 7 implies that this
mechanism can be implemented in O(m3n2) time.
Second mechanism is CRB as described in §3 applied to the slotted valuation model, i.e., for
j = 1, . . . ,m allocate the slot j to a bidder having highest order statistics of {cijνi(vi, ki)}ni=1
among those who have not been assigned a slot number less than j and who have ki ≤ j.
Assume that for all i, vi, the virtual valuation function νi is non-decreasing in vi and ki. Since, for
all i, v−i and k, the click-through-rate of the slot allocated to advertiser i is non-decreasing in vi,
this mechanism is IC. Also note that for all i, v, k−i, the click-through-rate of the slot allocated
to advertiser i is non-decreasing in ki, which implies that the nominal surplus, u
0
i (v,k) is non-
decreasing in ki. Thus, we can set the side payments ui to be identically zero for this allocation
rule, i.e. under CRB, the advertisers does not earn any information rent due to the ki dimension
of the bid. Moreover, algorithm ComputeCRBPrices can be used ki times for each i to compute
the prices that implement the slotted CRB mechanism in O(m3n) time. The following lemma
summarize the above results.
Lemma 8. If the virtual valuations νi(vi, ki), i = 1, . . . , n are non-decreasing in vi and ki then
X∗CRB is incentive compatible with unique minimal prices and side payments ui identically set to
zero. Furthermore, these prices can be computed in O(m3n) time.
Note that, given an IC allocation rule, X the nominal expected revenue,
E(v,k)
[ n∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
cijviXij(v)− u0i (v,k)
]
(26)
is an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue achievable by X. Since pointwise maximum X∗
defined in (23) is an upper bound on the optimal expected revenues, setting X = X∗ in (26) gives
an upper bound on the achievable optimal expected revenue. We compare the relative performance
of the two sub-optimal mechanisms proposed in the numerical study presented in the next section,
which is remarkable for the synthetic data set used.
Finally, we remark that the problem of finding optimal mechanism is hard because we need to
select both an allocation rule and a set of side payments independently. This is because the
transfer payment implementing a given IC allocation rule is not uniquely defined by the rule. We
conclude this section with the following result.
Lemma 9. Suppose the click-through-rates are separable. Then the CRB mechanism is optimal
for social surplus maximization. When the virtual surplus is non-decreasing in both vi and ki, the
CRB with ν(vi) is optimal for revenue maximization.
5 Comparing the mechanisms: a numerical study
In this section, we report the results of a numerical study that compares the revenue and efficiency
properties of the RB and CRB mechanisms as compared to the optimal mechanisms in the slot
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Figure 4: Ironed empirical virtual valuations vs. Gamma(5,1) virtual valuations
independent valuation model and the slotted model. We consider an adword auction model with 4
slots and 6 bidders, i.e. m = 4, n = 6,. The click-through-rate matrix is given by
C =


96 93 47 42
90 75 24 3
83 62 19 7
50 45 42 36
95 90 82 63
93 80 77 2


where cij denotes the expected number of clicks per day when bidder i is assigned to slot j. We
take the common random number approach and compare the average performance on a sample of
N = 10, 000 valuation vectors. For each bidder i = 1, . . . , 6, the synthetic valuations are generated
from a gamma distribution with mean 5 and standard deviation
√
5, i.e. vi ∼ Gamma(5, 1).
For virtual surplus maximization, we used the virtual valuations νGammai defined by theGamma(5, 1)
distribution5 as well as the virtual valuation ν˜i implied by the samples. Let v
[t]
i denote the value
in the t-th position when the samples {v(t)i }Nt=1 are sorted in increasing order. Then
ν˜i(v
[t]
i ) = v
[t]
i − (v[t+1]i − v[t]i )
1− t
N
1
N
t = 1, . . . , N − 1, ν˜i(v[N ]i ) = v[N ]i
Since the empirical virtual valuations is not monotone, we iron it using the ironing procedure in
Myerson (1981) to get monotone ironed empirical virtual valuations νˆi. From Figure 4 that displays
ν˜i, νˆi and ν
Gamma
i in the range of valuation where they are positive it is clear that all these three
quantities are very close.
5νGammai is increasing since Gamma(5,1) is strictly log-concave.
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5.1 Results for the uniform slot valuation model
As observed in Example 2 computing the optimal expected revenue (efficiency) maximizing rank
vectors is not a convex optimization problem and, therefore, cannot be solved efficiently. We
circumvent this issue by taking the common random number approach and maximizing the average
revenue (or efficiency) over the sampled data. For example, revenue maximizing rank vector
w∗ ∈ argmax
w∈Rn+,w1=1
1
N
N∑
t=1


m∑
i=1
m∑
j=i
(c[j](t),j − c[j](t),j+1)
γ
(t)
[j+1](t)
w
(t)
[j]

 ,
where γ(t) = (w∗1v
(t)
1 , . . . , w
∗
nv
(t)
n ), v(t) denotes the valuation vector for the t-th sample, and [j](t)
denotes the index of bidder ranked at the j-th position in the t-sample. For a given a ranking
vector and sample v(t), the slot prices can be computed in O(n log(n) + m2) time; therefore,
one can attempt optimizing the rank vector w using a derivative-free NLP method. We use a
Matlab based non-linear optimizer to solve these problems. Since the optimization problem is
unconstrained and low dimensional, the Matlab code is quite stable and converges quickly. The
efficiency maximizing rank vector was also computed from the samples.
Table 1 displays the average revenue and efficiency for the following mechanisms.
1. The revenue maximizing RB mechanism that uses the sample-based optimal rank vector w∗.
2. The efficiency maximizing RB that uses the sample-based optimal rank vector we.
3. heuristic RB mechanism: this mechanism uses the Google rank vector wi =
ci,1
c1,1
for efficiency
maximization and Yahoo rank vector (i.e. w = 1) for revenue maximization.
4. The CRB mechanism: for efficiency maximization the CRB ranks using the valuations vi and
for revenue maximization the CRB ranks using the virtual valuations νGamma(vi) and ˆ˜νi(vi).
5. The optimal mechanism for the true prior Gamma(5, 1) and the empirical prior distribution.
The superscripts “∗” and “e” denote the revenue maximizing mechanisms and efficiency maximizing
mechanism respectively. In the cells corresponding to the CRB and the optimal mechanism in
Table 1, the number inside (resp. outside) the bracket denotes the value obtained by using the
virtual valuation νˆi (resp. ν
Gamma
i ). For the optimal RB mechanisms the revenue and efficiency
was computed using the same set of N samples that were used to compute the rank vectors.
The optimal RB achieves 91.95% (92.24%) of the optimal revenue – in contrast, the CRB rule
achieves 95.75% (95.71%), thus providing a 3.80% (3.47%) improvement in revenues. Similarly,
optimal RB achieves 87.53% of the optimal efficiency and the CRB achieves 93.15% of the optimal
efficiency; thus, improving efficiency by 5.62% over the optimal RB.
Table 2 displays the optimal rank vectors, average slot prices and the advertiser’s surplus for optimal
RB and heuristic RB under both efficiency maximizing and revenue maximizing mechanisms.
These numerical results support the following observations.
a) The efficiency maximizing rank vector is more biased (i.e. away from 1) as compared to the
revenue maximizing rank vector. This is consistent with what was observed earlier in Example 2.
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Revenue Maximization Efficiency Maximization
Π∗ S∗ Πe Se
Heurestic RB 998.24 1523.91 938.70 1463.47
Optimal RB 1020.30 1558.90 1002.90 1571.40
CRB 1062.45(1058.62) 1585.85(1595.81) 829.36 1672.30
Optimal 1109.58(1106.08) 1687.53(1697.96) 1000.93 1795.24
Table 1: The revenue and efficiency in RB, CRB and optimal mechanisms
Optimal RB Heuristic RB
R.M. E.M. R.M. E.M.
w∗ u∗ p∗ we ue pe u∗ p∗ ue pe
1 1 105.19 4.5549 1 110.17 4.3125 140.09 4.3294 106.55 4.5954
2 1.1413 92.29 4.3256 1.2949 123.12 4.1794 91.73 4.1312 67.22 4.3611
3 1.1420 80.74 3.9090 1.0524 66.43 3.7919 68.28 3.7273 59.22 3.9414
4 0.8196 44.65 3.5485 0.6457 24.23 3.4902 71.54 3.4333 69.64 3.5342
5 0.9395 115.47 0.9538 126.82 32.81 131.50
6 1.0462 100.24 1.1093 117.67 120.34 91.54
Table 2: The average slot prices and advertiser surplus in optimalRB and heuristicRBmechanisms
b) The CRB mechanism tailored for revenue maximization results in higher average prices for each
slot and is, therefore, able to extract higher surplus.
c) The CRB mechanism tailored for efficiency maximization results in in low slot prices and,
consequently, low revenues. Thus, it is important that we maximize the virtual surplus when
CRB is used for revenue maximization.
d) The revenue generated by the RB mechanisms when maximizing surplus and virtual surplus is
comparable indicating that RB is a robust mechanism.
5.2 Results for slotted model
We assumed that the privately known slot value ki ∼ unif{1, . . . , 4} and generated N = 10000
samples. We used the same set of samples for the valuation as in the previous subsection.
Table 4 displays the average revenue and efficiency with the pointwise maximizer allocation rule
and CRB allocation rule. Table 5 displays the average advertiser surplus, average slot prices and
average side payments to each bidder. Note that the total average side payment is remarkably
low 6.40 (3.3237) when compared to the average revenue. The data in the table together with the
bound (26) implies that 988.61+6.40=995.01 (984.9536+3.3237= 988.2763) is an upper bound on
the achievable revenue. The pointwise maximizer achieves 99.36% (99.66%) revenue of this bound,
while the CRB achieves 94.78% (95.05%) revenue of this upper bound. Thus, both proposed
mechanisms are likely to be close to optimal. For efficiency, CRB achieves 92.79% of the true
optimal V CG (or pointwise maximizer with νi(vi) = vi) efficiency as shown in Table 4.
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CRB Optimal
R.M. E.M. R.M. E.M.
u∗ p∗ ue pe u∗ p∗ ue pe
1 121.93(125.53) 4.7052(4.6609) 185.92 3.8542 115.89(119.26) 4.4409(4.4139) 181.92 4.1223
2 61.26(62.58) 4.3955(4.3441) 56.19 3.3017 97.09(99.69) 4.1567(4.1124) 114.42 3.2994
3 48.23(46.41) 3.8203(3.7871) 30.09 2.2039 86.80(84.74) 3.7102(3.6775) 81.86 2.8008
4 58.45(62.89) 3.2472(3.2937) 115.06 1.6034 51.31(55.22) 2.9123(2.9355) 52.82 2.9273
5 130.23(133.05) 280.58 117.65(119.83) 194.21
6 103.31(106.72) 175.12 109.22(113.14) 169.08
Table 3: The average slot prices and advertiser surplus in CRB and optimal mechanisms
Revenue Maximization Efficiency Maximization
Π∗ S∗ Πe Se
Pointwise Maximizer 988.61 (984.95) 1468.91(1475.55) 806.50 1562.49
CRB 943.11 (939.37) 1385.20 (1392.49) 695.64 1449.87
Table 4: The revenue and efficiency in CRB and optimal mechanisms
Table 5 presents the average side payments, average advertiser surplus and the average slot prices
per click for both the mechanisms. The prices tabulated are not adjusted for side payments. This
is because side payments could be positive even when no slot is allocated to the advertiser (this
happens when at a particular bid profile the advertiser can get a positive allocation by underbidding
ki; however, no slot is allocated at the true ki). We found that the distribution of side payments is
very skewed, i.e. even though the average side payments are very small, at certain bid profiles the
side payments are of the same order of magnitude as the advertiser surplus.
Pointwise Maximizer CRB
R.M. E.M. R.M. E.M.
u∗ p∗ u∗ ue pe u∗ p∗ ue pe
1 97.68(100.15) 4.9157(4.8965) 1.7401(0.9592) 164.73 4.6090 114.61(118.04) 5.0799(5.0405) 196.07 4.2767
2 78.55(80.70) 4.3183(4.2910) 0.8961(0.6066) 101.03 3.4710 61.77(63.17) 4.243(4.2082) 73.19 3.0186
3 66.60(65.06) 3.1226(3.1033) 0.6893(0.5558) 69.42 1.6009 48.47(46.51) 2.7492(2.7484) 46.36 1.1265
4 37.36(39.61) 1.0297(1.0457) 0.4743(0.1776) 58.29 0.2571 35.84(38.51) 1.0054(1.0260) 71.52 0.0888
5 101.78(103.31) 1.6600(0.5830) 195.57 97.02(99.04) 207.09
6 91.93(95.12) 0.9417(0.4405) 166.95 84.38(87.86) 160.00
Table 5: The average slot prices and advertiser surplus in CRB and optimal mechanisms in the
slotted mechanism
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6 Conclusion
The discrete structure of the adword auction allocation space allows us to reduce the IC constraint
to the existence of bidder dependent slot prices at which each bidder self-selects their allocated slot.
We use this new characterization to show that in this auction models there are IC mechanisms
which are not affine maximizers. Achieving optimal revenues with multi-dimensional types in this
model remains a hard stochastic program involving multi-dimensional ironing and sweeping.
In slot independent private valuation model, the pricing characterization collapses to the existence
of ordered threshold at which a given advertiser is allocated particular slots. The prices imple-
menting any IC allocation rule can by computed very efficiently. When the click through rate is
not separable, we show that the revenue (efficiency) maximizing rank vector can be efficiently com-
puted using the history of bids available for each adword. When prior information is unavailable,
the proposed CRB allocation rule is a very attractive choice since it is simple, non-parametric,
computationally efficient and has a superior performance to any rank based mechanism. Our nu-
merical study also indicate that bothRB and CRB achieve close to optimal revenues and efficiency
without using detailed prior information.
In the slotted auction model even though the set of IC mechanism is easy to characterize, computing
the optimal mechanism problem is a hard because of the non-zero side payments needed to screen
the slot information. Our numerical study indicates that the two sub-optimal mechanisms proposed
in this paper are likely to perform close to optimal.
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